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Court Responses to Tarasoff Statutes
Claudia Kachigian, MD, JD, and Alan R. Felthous, MD
Twenty-three states have enacted Tarasoff statutes applicable to psychiatrists. Since the first such statute was
enacted in California in 1985, a significant number of courts in states with this and similar statutes have reviewed
Tarasoff-type claims. This article reviews courts’ analyses in 76 such cases. There were five basic categories
identified, including cases that (1) did not reference the statute; (2) referenced the statute, but did not analyze it;
(3) referenced the statute, analyzed it, and found it created a duty; (4) referenced the statute, analyzed it, but found
it did not create a duty; and (5) referenced the statute in the context of testimonial privilege. Review of these cases
revealed that even in states that have Tarasoff statutes, clinicians must continue to rely on their clinical and ethical
judgment, rather than statutory guidance, when considering potential protective disclosures or future drafts of
protective disclosure statutes.
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The Supreme Court of California’s Tarasoff decision
in 19761 brought to California psychotherapists a
duty to protect others from the violent acts of their
patients—a duty that included the communication
of verbal warnings. Especially since the American
Psychiatric Association had argued in its brief to the
California court2 that psychiatrists had no standard
for predicting dangerousness and that the risks of
such a duty could outweigh any protective benefits,
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals
naturally awaited the court decisions to follow, in
California and other states, with anxious concern.
Court decisions that followed were, all in all, even
more disconcerting because of their variance, one
from the other, and their seeming unpredictability.
If not already clear from the Tarasoff principle
itself, the Superior Court of Law, Legal Division, in
New Jersey demonstrated in McIntosh v. Milano3
that courts would not confine the protective duty to
factual situations in which a verbal threat was ex-
pressed. The Supreme Court of California then ap-
peared to place some restrictions on the application
of the duty to protect in Thompson v. County of Al-
ameda in 1980.4 Although this description of when
the duty arises seemed more specific and concrete
and was therefore regarded as some reassurance
among mental health professionals, the so-called
Thompson-Tarasoff rule still left to interpretation the
meaning of “predictable threat.” In Hedlund v. Supe-
rior Court of Orange County 5 the Supreme Court
of California recognized that protective duties could
extend to an unnamed, unthreatened victim, if it
were foreseeable that such a victim would be in
the presence of a targeted victim and therefore shared
the risk; but even the targeted victim need not have
been named or specifically threatened by the patient
for the protective duty to apply, according to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in another Califor-
nia case.6
Outside California, duty to warn/protect cases
were, as anticipated, heard by courts in other states.
Rules established by other courts, as has been sum-
marized elsewhere,7 varied greatly, some more ex-
pansive than the Tarasoff principle, others, more re-
strictive. Such rules included, for example,
foreseeable violence, foreseeable victim, identifiable
victim, specificity, and zone of danger. Already, by
1982, at least one court8 had found no legal duty to
protect without a legally controlling relationship
over the patient. If psychiatrists in California faced
the possibility of indeterminate expansion of third-
party liability, those in other states faced even greater
uncertainty about what form legal duty to protect
others would take in their jurisdictions.
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In the quest for greater clarity, predictability of
judicial application, and clinical practicality, psychi-
atrists and other professionals in California success-
fully appealed to the state legislature for enactment of
a statute that would clarify when a warning is per-
missible (thus addressing the confidentiality di-
lemma) and provide liability protection for therapists
who acted in compliance with this statute. Thus, the
first of the so-called Tarasoff or protective disclosure
statutes was enacted and signed into law in 1985. In
1988, Appelbaum et al.9 comprehensively reviewed
this and 11 other protective disclosure statutes that
followed. Today, 23 such statutes pertaining to psy-
chiatrists have been enacted. Although not for psy-
chiatrists, additional statutes in still other states pro-
vide statutory guidance and some liability protection
for other professionals.
Over a quarter of a century after the Tarasoff de-
cision and 18 years after the first Tarasoff protective
disclosure statute, this is a fitting time to review court
decisions in states with such statutes. To what extent
do courts base their decisions on the protective dis-
closure statutes of their state? Have these statutes
made a difference after all? Answers to these ques-
tions are important for both clinicians who endeavor
to practice legally and policy makers who shape the
legal framework in which psychiatrists apply their
trade.
In pursuit of answers to these questions, first, a
search for states that have enacted protective disclo-
sure statutes was completed. A search for cases in
those states, decided after the statutes were enacted,
that involved “duty to warn” or Tarasoff-type situa-
tions, followed. After these searches were completed,
each court decision was reviewed regarding its ap-
proach to the statute. This review included analysis
of how and whether the court considered the statute
at all in arriving at a holding.
In the search for statutes, only those resulting from
the aftermath of the Tarasoff decision, and not those
that, loosely construed, could be considered to estab-
lish a specific duty to third parties (e.g., statutes al-
lowing disclosure for purposes of civilly committing
a person who generally poses a danger to self or oth-
ers) were included. Furthermore, only those statutes
that applied to psychiatrists among those therein ref-
erenced were included. As previously noted, many
such statutes apply solely to other professionals, in-
cluding psychologists, social workers, family thera-
pists, and other “counselors.”10
For purposes of this article, a Tarasoff, or protec-
tive disclosure, statute must apply to psychiatrists,
contain some type of specificity rule (i.e., require an
actual threat to an identifiable victim), and include
some type of immunity for disclosure. These inclu-
sion criteria sufficiently restrict the focus to statutes
enacted as a consequence of the psychiatrist’s duty to
nonpatient third parties as established by Tarasoff
and its progeny.
Regarding the subsequent search for cases, inclu-
sion criteria were not as restrictive. Included was any
case in a state with a protective disclosure statute that
was decided after the statute was enacted, involved an
injured third party’s suing a mental health profes-
sional, and/or cited the statute in some type of pro-
tective disclosure context. Cases not involving a
mental health professional, but addressing a duty to
warn a third party based on the statute, were also
included, since they provide some insight into the
court’s view toward the statute. A few nonincluded
cases cited the statute, but for purposes unrelated to
Tarasoff questions (e.g., in exploration of the appro-
priate definition of “serious bodily injury”).11 In
some states, the protective disclosure provisions are
part of a broader statute addressing multiple excep-
tions to nondisclosure, such as compliance with child
abuse or sex offender reporting laws. Only when a
case cited the particular protective disclosure provi-
sion, as opposed to any of the other allowed excep-
tions enumerated in the same statute, was the case
included. Finally, the focus was on appellate or state
supreme court decisions, as most lower court deci-
sions are not published.
Although the search was exhaustive, not every case
involving duties to third parties since these statutes
were enacted was included. As mentioned, many
lower court decisions are not published, yet may have
an impact on clinical practices in the local area. Fur-
thermore, litigation is not a static process. Unlike
legislatures that are only in session at certain times,
courts, for the most part, are always in session and
new cases are decided continually. However, most
relevant higher court decisions are included and pro-
vide a sufficient database for this review.
Review of Statutes
This article focuses on the manner in which a
court interprets a statute in terms of whether the
statute establishes a duty to a third party and, if so,
whether the statute restricts such a duty. Therefore,
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language in the statute describing the circumstance
under which a duty may arise, rather than discharge
of the duty, or immunity provisions of the statute, is
relevant.
Twenty-three states’ statutes met the inclusion cri-
teria. The statutes were divided into four categories
based on how the duty was addressed.
Statutes That Seem Explicitly to Establish
a Duty
These statutes contain terminology that appears to
create a definite duty, such as “a mental health pro-
fessional has a duty. . .” (all italic type has been added
for emphasis). States with this type of statute are
Idaho, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, and
Virginia (see Table 1 for citations not referenced in
text).
Statutes that Prohibit Liability Except Under
Specified Circumstances
The majority of statutes fall within this category
that appears to create a duty, but in a less direct
manner. These statutes are phrased in a conditional
manner: “There can be no cause of action and no
liability. . .unless. . . .” States with this type of statute
are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana,12 Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska,13 New Jersey, Tennessee, and Utah.
Statutes that Seem to Be Permissive
In this category, the statutory language appears to
allow, but not to require, disclosure. For example,
“The psychiatrist may disclose. . .” Only two states,
Florida and Mississippi,14 follow this pattern.
Statutes That Take Other Approaches
Four states, California, Illinois, Ohio, and Wash-
ington, have statutes with unique approaches that do
not fall into any of the previous categories and are not
found in any other state.
First, the California statute, the first Tarasoff stat-
ute, if strictly read, initially seems, as in the second
category mentioned, to establish a duty indirectly;
but in the next paragraph, its language places the
existence of such a duty in doubt:
(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause
of action shall arise against, any person who is a psychothera-
pist. . .in failing to warn of and protect from a patient’s violent
behavior except where the patient has communicated to the
psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a
reasonably identifiable victim or victims.
(b) If there is a duty to warn and protect under the limited
circumstances specified above, the duty shall be discharged
by. . . .
This seems to be an attempt to acknowledge the
growing case law in the state by clearly delineating
when protective action might be taken and providing
immunity when action is taken, but without conced-
ing that a duty to take such action exists. Therefore,
one might consider this to be another permissive
statute.
The Ohio statute,15 in the final analysis, also ap-
pears to be permissive: “A mental health profes-
sional. . .may be held liable. . .only if. . .,” but uses
language that places that assumption in some doubt.
Illinois has two statutes that address a protective
disclosure in a Tarasoff-type situation. The first is in
a section entitled “Good faith; exemption from lia-
bility” and includes exemptions from liability for dis-
closure in a number of situations. One exemption is
for “failure to warn of and protect from” a patient’s
violence “except where the recipient has communi-
cated to the person a serious threat of physical vio-
lence against a reasonably identifiable victim or vic-
tims”—thereby prohibiting liability except under
specified circumstances.
However, another section, addressing “Disclosure
of records and communications,” contains a provi-
sion stating that there may be disclosure “when, and
to the extent, in the therapist’s sole discretion, dis-
closure is necessary to warn or protect a specific in-
dividual against whom a recipient has made a specific
threat of violence where there exists a therapist-recip-
ient relationship or a special recipient-individual re-
lationship.” While the previous section appears to
create a conditional duty, this provision appears to be
permissive.
Finally, Washington, similar to Illinois, has two
statutes that reference a possible Tarasoff-type duty,
one in a section entitled “exemptions from liability”
providing that:
(1) No. . .mental health professional. . .shall be civilly or crimi-
nally liable for performing duties. . .with regard to the decision
of whether to admit, discharge, release, administer antipsy-
chotic medications or detain a person for evaluation and treat-
ment. . .(2) This section does not relieve a person from. . .the duty
to warn or to take reasonable precautions. . .The duty. . .is dis-
charged if. . .
The other is in a section entitled “confidential in-
formation and records-disclosure” and provides
“. . .Information and records may be disclosed
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Table 1 Court Responses to Tarasoff Statutes
State (Statute) Case (Year) Court Approach*
Approaches:
1. Cases not referencing the statute
2. Cases referencing the statute, but not using it in their analysis
3. Cases referencing the statute, using it in their analysis, and finding that it creates a duty,
a. but finding it unconstitutional
b. and finding that the facts fell within the statutorialy defined circumstances
c. and finding that the facts did not fall within the statutorily defined circumstances
d. and finding that the facts did not fall within statutorialy defined circumstances, but that there may be/still is a common law duty
e. and finding that the facts fell within statutaroily defined circumstances and that the statute abrogates any common law duty
4. Cases referencing the statute, using it in the analysis, but finding that it does not create a duty
5. Cases referencing the statute in the context of testimonial privilege
Arizona
A.R.S. § 36-517.02 (1989) Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center,
919 P.2d 1368 (1995)
Court of Appeals 3a
Tamsen v. Weber, 802 P.2d 1063 (1990) Court of Appeals 1
California
Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92
(1985)
Silvaz ex rel. Ayala v. South Bay Community Services, 2003
WL 23419 (2003) (nonpublished) (2003)
Court of Appeals, Fourth District 2
Suzuki v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2002 WL 258263 (2002)
(nonpublished) (2002)
Court of Appeals, Second District 3c
People v. Felix, 112 Cal. Rptr.2d 311 (2001) Court of Appeals, Second District 2
Tilley v. Schulte, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 497 (1999) Court of Appeals, Second District,
Division 6
3c
Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr.2d 46 (1996) Court of Appeals, First District,
Division 2
1
Barry v. Turek, 267 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1990) Court of Appeals, First District,
Division 2
3c
Michael E.L. v. County of San Diego, 228 Cal. Rptr. 139
(1986)




C.R.S.A. § 13-21-117 Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp.2d 1196 (2001) Federal District Court 3c
(1986) McCarty v. Kaiser-Hill, 15 P.3d 1122 (2000) Court of Appeals 3b
Sheron v. Lutheran Medical Center, 18 P.3d 796 (2000) Court of Appeals 3c
Halverson v. Pikes Peak Family Counseling and Mental
Health Center, 851 P.2d 833 (1992)
Court of Appeals 3b
Halverson v. Pikes Peak Family Counseling and Mental
Health Center, 795 P.2d 1352 (1990)
Court of Appeals 3b
Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (1989) Supreme Court 1
Delaware
16 Del.C. § 5402 Shively v. Ken Crest Center for Exceptional Persons, 2001
WL 209910 (2001) (unpublished) (2001)
Superior Court 1
Bright v. State, 740 A.2d 927 (1999) Supreme Court 1
State v. Bright, 683 A.2d 1055 (1996) Superior Court 1
Florida
F.S.A. § 456.059 (2000) State v. Famiglietti, 817 So.2d 901 (2002) Court of Appeals, Fifth District 5
formerly F.S.A. Guerrier v. State, 811 So.2d 852 (2002) Court of Appeals, Fifth District 5
§ 491.0147 (1991) State v. Famiglietti, 817 So.2d 915 (2001) Court of Appeals, Third District 5
O’Keefe v. Orea, 731 So.2d 680 (1998) Court of Appeals, First District 1
Green v. Ross, 691 So.2d 542 (1997) Court of Appeals, Second District 4
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446 (1991) Court of Appeals, Third District 2
Santa Cruz v. Northwest Dade Community Health Center,
590 So.2d 444 (1991)
Court of Appeals, Third District 1
Idaho
I.C. § 6-1901 through Doe v. Garcia, 961 P.2d 1181 (1998) Supreme Court 1
1903 (1991) Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, 968 P.2d 215 (1998) Supreme Court 2
Illinois
405 ILCS 5/6-103 (1991) People v. Ranstrom, 710 N.E.2d 61 (1999) Court of Appeals, First District 5
Charleston v. Larson, 696 N.E.2d 793 (1998) Court of Appeals, First District,
Division 3
1
Chapa v. Adams, 1997 WL 414107 (1997) Federal Northern District of Illinois 4
Court Responses to Tarasoff Statutes
266 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
Table 1 (continued)
State (Statute) Case (Year) Court Approach*
Kentucky
KRS § 202A.400 (1986) Riley v. United Health Care of Hardin, 165 F.3d 28 (1998)
(unpublished)
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 3e
Evans v. Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696 (1988) Court of Appeals 2
Louisiana
LSA-R.S. 9:2800.2 (1986) Grady v. Riley, 809 So.2d 567 (2002) Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 3c
Barbarin v. Dudley, 775 So.2d 657 (2000) Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 3d
Clark v. Baird, 714 So.2d 840 (1998) Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 3c
Davis v. Puryear, 673 So.2d 1298 (1996) Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 2
Durapau v. Jenkins, 656 So.2d 1067 (1995) Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 3d
Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So.2d 415 (1994) Supreme Court 2
In re Viviano, 645 So.2d 1301 (1994) Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 2
Hines v. Bick, 566 So.2d 455 (1990) Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 3d
Sayes v. Pilgrim Manor, 536 So.2d 705 (1988) Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 1
Sanchez v. State, 506 So.2d 777 (1987) Court of Appeals, First Circuit 1
Maryland
Md 5-6 § 5-609 (1989) Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 745 A.2d 1054 (2000) Court of Appeals 5
Falk v. Southern Maryland Hospital, Inc., 742 A.2d 51 (1999) Court of Special Appeals 3e
Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn, 642 A.23 219 (1994) Court of Appeals 1
Massachusetts
MA ST 123 § 36a (1989) Magee v. U.S., 121 F.3d 1 (1997) First Circuit Court of Appeals 1
Carr v. Howard (1996) (unpublished) Superior Court 3d
Michigan
M.C.L.A. 330.1946 (1989) Gragg v. Auburn Counseling Associates, Inc., 2002 WL
1375746 (2002)
Court of Appeals 3c
Lagow ex. Rel. Estate of Wilson, 2001 WL 936637 (2001) Court of Appeals 3d
Johnson v. Hegira Programs, Inc., 1999 WL 33437934 (1999) Court of Appeals 2
Richter v. Turlo, 1999 WL 33435417 (1999) Court of Appeals 3c
Swan v. Wedgewood Christian Youth & Family Services,
Inc., 583 N.W.2d 719 (1998)
Court of Appeals 3d
Douglas ex rel. Estate of Douglas v. Alpena Gen. Hosp.,
1997 WL 33334398 (1997)
Court of Appeals 3c
Williams ex rel. Estate of Anderson v. Northville Regional
Psychiatric Hosp., 1997 WL 33347863 (1997)
Court of Appeals 3d
Jenks v. Brown, 557 N.W.2d 114 (1996) Court of Appeals 3d
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (1994) Court of Appeals 5
U.S. v. Snelenberger, 24 T.3d 799 (1994) Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 5
Saur v. Probes, 476 N.W.2d 496 (1991) Court of Appeals 2




Lacock v. U.S., 106 F.3d 408 (Table) (1997) (Unpublished) Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 3d
New Hampshire
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 329:31 (1994)
Powell v. Catholic Medical Center, 749 A.2d 301 (2000) Supreme Court 3d
New Jersey
N.J. Stat. Ann § 2A:62A-17
(West 1991)
Correia v. Sherry 760 A.2d. 1156 (2000) Superior Court, Law Division,
Sussex County
5




U.S. v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (2000) Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 5
Tabor v. Veterans Administration, ex. rel. U.S., 198 F.3d 247
(1999)
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 3e
Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (1997) Supreme Court 1




Thornock ex rel. Thornock v. Christensen, 2000 WL
33250541 (2000)
Court of Appeals 3d
Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (1998) Supreme Court 3d
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (1993) Supreme Court 2
Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (1991) Supreme Court 1
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only. . .” The statute goes on to explain circum-
stances when one may disclose, including “specific-
ity”-type situations, describes to whom one may dis-
close, and provides immunity for the disclosure.
The first section implies there is a duty to pro-
tect, while the second more permissively allows
warning.
The reason qualifying terms such as “appears
to” are used, even if the statute’s language and
intent seem straightforward, becomes evident
when court decisions are reviewed. The statutes
mean what courts interpret them to mean, even if
those interpretations seemingly contradict the lan-
guage of a statute. Furthermore, if a court does not
consider the statute in a case wherein it would
seem to apply, the existence of a duty in a practical
sense, even if explicitly referenced in a statute, is
called into question.
Review of Cases
Today, most states that have enacted a protec-
tive disclosure statute have case law regarding the
issue. Of the 23 states with protective disclosure
statutes, 18 have cases that address potential Tara-
soff situations (Table 1). As might be expected,
given the diverse interpretations by courts across
the nation of the mental health provider’s duty to
third parties prior to such duties becoming statu-
torily defined, court approaches after statutory en-
actment are similarly lacking in uniformity. How-
ever, these decisions can be categorized into five
basic court approaches:
1. Cases not referencing the statute
2. Cases referencing the statute, but not using it in
their analysis
3. Cases referencing the statute, using it in their
analysis, and finding that it creates a duty,
a. but finding it unconstitutional
b. and finding that the facts fell within the statu-
torily defined circumstances
c. and finding that the facts did not fall within
the statutorily defined circumstances
d. and finding that the facts did not fall within
statutorily defined circumstances, but that
there may be/still is a common law duty
e. and finding the facts fell within statutorily de-
fined circumstances, and the statute abrogates
any common law duty.
4. Cases referencing the statute, using it in the anal-
ysis, but finding that it does not create a duty
5. Cases referencing the statute in the context of
testimonial privilege
1. Cases Not Referencing the Statute
Of the 76 cases included, 21, despite having a
potentially applicable protective disclosure statute on
the books in the respective state, did not mention the
statute even with factual circumstances that would
seemingly implicate it (see Table 1 for all cases and
their categorization). In some cases, the actual events
occurred prior to enactment of the statute. There-
fore, one could assume that the statute would not
have been applicable, so the court did not address it.
However, other courts, even under these circum-
stances, acknowledged the existence of the statute,
but explained that it was inapplicable.16 In other cir-
cumstances, the reason for not referencing the statute
is not at all clear. The Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division, for example, did not
mention the statute in a case wherein an inpatient
attacked a nurse who subsequently sued the treating
psychiatrist for failure to protect her. In finding there
to be no protective duty under the circumstances, the
court reviewed relevant state case law, and included
Table 1 (continued)





Head v. Inova Health Services, 2001 WL 1829720 (2001) Circuit Court 3b
Walker’s Adm. V. Simmons, 2001 WL 1711401 (2001) Circuit Court 3b
Sage v. U.S., 947 F.Supp. 851 (1997) Federal Eastern District 1




State v. Side, 21 P.3d 321 (2001) Court of Appeals 5
Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.05.120 (1991)
Harris v. U.S., 122 F.3d 1071 (1997) (unpublished) (1997) Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit 1
Tobis v. State, 758 P.2d 534 (1988) Court of Appeals 3c
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an analysis of duty to warn without reviewing either
of the Illinois statutes.17
2. Cases Referencing the Statute, but Not Using
It in Their Analysis
Twelve of the cases fell within this category. In
some cases, the courts clarified that the statute was
not applicable because the facts occurred prior to the
statute’s enactment. In other cases, the statute was
not considered to be directly on point, although re-
lated to the facts. For example, in a Michigan Court
of Appeals case in 1999,18 a suicidal evaluee in a crisis
center was assaulted by another evaluee while both
were sitting in a waiting room. The evaluating psy-
chiatrist had already determined the second evaluee
to be at risk for committing assault. The victim sued
for failure to protect. The lower court found that the
psychiatrist had discharged any potential duty under
Michigan’s protective disclosure statute by initiating
hospitalization procedures for the assaultive patient.
The appellate court found that the lower court
should not have applied the statute, but agreed that
the psychiatrist was not liable because the defendant
did not show any breach of the standard of care under
basic malpractice law. The court did not go on to
define circumstances under which the statute might
be applicable. In another case, the court referenced
the statute, but did not clearly indicate why it was not
used in its analysis.19 However, it may have been
because the statute applied to “mental health profes-
sionals,” and the party named in the suit was a facil-
ity, not a person.
Thirty-two cases fall within the third category,
which has five sub-categories.
3. Cases Referencing the Statute, Using It in
Their Analysis, and Finding That It Creates
a Duty
a. But Finding It Unconstitutional
Among the cases in this subcategory is one
wherein an Arizona appellate court found that the
statute was unconstitutional based on a provision of
the Arizona constitution.20 In this case, a wife who
was stabbed by her outpatient husband sued the
clinic that placed him in an outpatient program
rather than hospitalizing him. Initially, the court
found the statute to be “the exclusive means of estab-
lishing liability in this context” and precluded the
claim, because, despite having physically assaulted
his wife previously, the patient had never specifically
threatened her. In the Arizona constitution, how-
ever, there is a provision stating that “the right of
action to recover damages for injuries shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be
subject to any statutory limitation.” Because Ari-
zona, under common law, had established a broader
duty to protect, the court found the statute to be an
unconstitutional abrogation of damage recovery.
b. And Finding That the Facts Fell Within the Statutorily
Defined Circumstances
In four cases, the court found the statute to be
applicable, relied on the statute in its analysis, found
that it created a duty, and found that the facts of the
case fell within the statutorily defined circumstances,
thereby precluding liability of the mental health care
provider. The Colorado Court of Appeals in 200021
found a psychologist not to be liable for breach of
confidentiality when he informed his patient’s super-
visors of what he perceived to be threats made toward
them by his patient during an early morning phone
call. The patient claimed that his statements were not
threats. The court applied the statute strictly, finding
the statute was intended for just this type of situation,
and its immunity provision precluded any liability.
In a Virginia Circuit Court case in 2001 in which
a psychiatrist was sued under the protective disclo-
sure statute after he had allowed a weekend visit for a
patient who subsequently stabbed to death the five-
year-old nephew of the patient’s mother whom the
patient was visiting, the court found sufficient facts
to support potential liability under the statutory pro-
visions. In finding that there was a potential cause of
action against the psychiatrist, the court noted that
the patient had “communicated. . .on numerous oc-
casions that she intended to seriously injure or kill
peers, staff and/or family members.” Furthermore,
the patient actually had, “on numerous occasions,”
attacked peers, staff and family members.
The court found that these circumstances met the
statutory criteria of a “specific and immediate threat
to cause bodily injury or death to an identified or
readily identifiable person or persons,” despite the
seemingly nonspecific nature of the threats that ref-
erenced general groups of people.22
c. And Finding That the Facts Did Not Fall Within Statutorily
Defined Circumstances
The next subcategory includes four cases in which
the courts acknowledged the statute, but found that
Kachigian and Felthous
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the facts of the case did not meet statutory require-
ments. There may not have been specificity, an actual
threat, or an identifiable victim, or the actual victim
was not the identifiable victim. Applying Louisiana
law, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found no
liability, because the defendant was not a mental
health professional.23 An elderly woman’s primary
care physician informed his patient’s home health aid
that the elderly woman’s daughter was mentally ill
and violent. After receiving this information, the
home health aid decided to leave and was assaulted
by the woman’s daughter while leaving. The home
health aid subsequently sued the primary care physi-
cian. Because he was not a mental health professional
as defined by the statute, he was not found liable
under the statute, but the court suggested that he
may have had a “legal duty” not involving the statute.
Another case in this category involves the infa-
mous Columbine High School shootings, when two
students brandishing firearms entered the school and
proceeded to fire on teachers and students before
eventually fatally shooting themselves. Relatives of a
slain high school student sued the sheriff’s depart-
ment on multiple counts involving claimed inade-
quacies of the sheriff’s department’s response to
events prior to the shooting. In its opinion, the court
referenced the state’s protective disclosure statute as
an example of immunity for mental health profes-
sionals, except when there is a “serious threat of im-
minent physical violence against a specific person
or persons.” It opined that state police officers
should not bear the burden of a “higher duty” than
that of mental health professionals who “routinely
deal with such issues.” Furthermore, even if the
statute applied to the police, there would be no
liability, because the threats made by the assailants
were neither imminent nor directed against the
actual victims.24
d. And Finding That the Facts Did Not Fall Within Statutorily
Defined Circumstances, but There May Be/Still Is a Common
Law Duty
In 10 cases, the circumstances did not meet statu-
tory requirements, but a common law duty may, or
still does, apply. The Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire in 200025 provided an exemplary case. In that
case, a stroke patient assaulted a phlebotomist as she
was attempting to draw his blood. She claimed the
nonpsychiatrist physician owed her a duty to warn.
Although the statute did not apply in this case be-
cause there was no specific threat to an identified
victim, the court found that a common law duty as
established by previous case law remained and could
sustain a cause of action independent of the statute. A
Michigan court of appeals in 200126 declined to ad-
dress whether a common law duty survived enact-
ment of the protective disclosure statute when the
facts of the case would not have supported a claim
under the statute or common law, because there was
no communicated threat.
e. And Finding That the Facts Fell Within Statutorily Defined
Circumstances and That the Statute Abrogates Any Common
Law Duty
The final subcategory represents perhaps the type
of approach mental health professionals had hoped
the courts would take regarding protective disclosure
statutes. These are cases in which the court recog-
nized, applied, and found the statute to circumscribe
the mental health professional’s duty to protect. In
other words, no “common law” remained after the
statute was enacted. Of the three cases in this cate-
gory, two were decided by the same court, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, a federal court interpreting
Tarasoff statutes in two different states: Kentucky
and Tennessee. In the Sixth Circuit case reviewing
the Tennessee statute,27 an inpatient was released, as
he had been on two prior occasions without incident,
to testify in a court case in which he was involved. He
was staying in a hotel where he had an argument with
a hotel security guard, whom the patient had never
met before, and fatally shot the security guard with
the guard’s own gun. The decedent security guard’s
parents claimed the Veterans Administration Medi-
cal Center that released the patient had a duty to
warn their victim son of the patient’s release. The
court focused exclusively on the statute when it
found no liability, because the statute required an
actual threat against a clearly identified victim. The
patient neither threatened nor identified any victim.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in analyzing the Ken-
tucky statute in a case wherein a 15-year-old patient
killed his mother five days after release from inpa-
tient treatment,28 found that the statute required
communication of a specific threat against a reason-
ably identifiable victim. The teenager never specifi-
cally threatened to kill his mother. The court noted
that common law, prior to the statute’s enactment,
had a broader reach, possibly requiring the victim
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only to be foreseeable, but the statute superseded
common law.
4. Cases Referencing the Statute, Using It in the
Analysis, but Finding That It Did Not Create
a Duty
One Florida case in 1997 found the state’s protec-
tive disclosure statute’s language to be too “nebu-
lous” to create a duty that could have a tremendous
impact on certain social interactions.29 As men-
tioned under the review of statutes, the Florida stat-
ute was couched in permissive terms.
A 1997 Illinois case involved claims that were
based on the plaintiff’s losing his job after his psychi-
atrist warned the plaintiff’s employer of the plaintiff’s
threats against the employer. The court opined that
there was no liability, because under the Illinois stat-
ute, a therapist is permitted to disclose such informa-
tion to warn a potential victim.30 Recall that Illinois
has another protective disclosure statute that is con-
ditional rather than permissive and was not men-
tioned in this case.
5. Cases Referencing the Statute in the Context
of Testimonial Privilege
These four cases mention the statute out of a direct
duty-to-protect context, but focus on the statute’s
implications on testimonial privilege. The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, applying Tennessee law, de-
cided such a case in 2000.31 A patient sought to have
the testimony of his therapist suppressed in a case
against him for making threats to kill a federal offi-
cial. In finding that there was no exception to psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege in criminal cases, the
court merely referenced the statute as an example of
an exception allowed in a civil context. The court
reasoned that the effect of allowing such an exception
in a criminal context would be significantly more
chilling to the therapeutic process than in a civil
context.
Because these cases actually cite the statutes, they
were included in this review. Other, perhaps better
known cases, such as the California cases Menendez v.
Superior Court32 and People v. Wharton,33 which ex-
plored the privilege issue and allowed testimony
based on a California rule of evidence and state case
law, including Tarasoff, were not included, because
they did not cite the statute or they did not directly
involve a third party suing a mental health profes-
sional for failure to warn or protect.
Discussion
Of the five categories of responses presented in this
article, the most interesting, or at least unanticipated,
were the first category, wherein the statute was not
referenced when it, arguably, should have been, and
the subsection of the third category, wherein the
court found that a common law duty survived any
interpretation of the statutory duty. Although both
of these particular interpretations were disappointing
in helping better define protective duties, analysis of
these cases offers some insight into the judicial, legal,
and clinical implications of these statutes in general.
Determining the reasons courts seemingly ignore
these statutes can only be a speculative exercise.
However, possible explanations include the courts’
effort to demonstrate their ongoing control over es-
tablishing this type of duty despite legislative action;
or, as a more benign view, courts simply may not
have addressed the statute because lawyers did not
reference it in their arguments to the court; or simply
because they were not aware of its existence. Another
potential explanation for judicial nonconsideration
of Tarasoff statutes is a conscious disregard of the
statutes by both clinicians and trial attorneys. An
attorney for the defense in a case that did not refer-
ence the statute and an expert psychiatric witness
from such a case in a different state both reported
that they did not find the statute applicable in their
respective cases. Yet, similar fact patterns in other
states triggered review of the protective disclosure
statute. It seems that the very specificity sought in
creating the legislation to define protective duties
better has, in at least some instances, precluded the
courts’ consideration of the statute at all. To what
extent are clinicians informed of Tarasoff statutes
once enacted? To what extent do they deliberately
conform protective and confidentiality practices to
the Tarasoff statute in their state? To what extent do
they document their decisions to disclose or not to
disclose based on these statutes? When complaints
arise concerning failure to warn and protect or failure
to maintain confidentiality, do trial attorneys refer-
ence the state statutes and use them to support the
plaintiff’s complaint or to defend the clinician? Con-
ceivably many clinicians and attorneys alike are more
familiar with the celebrated Tarasoff case itself than
with the jurisdictional statutory law. Perhaps more
attention to specific statutes at the level of clinical
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and legal practice would result in greater regard for
these laws by trial and appellate courts.
The other surprising approach was to review the
facts not only under the statutory provision, but also
the common law. It appears from the cases in this
category, that these courts were reluctant to elimi-
nate this cause of action as a means of recovery for
victims. The Arizona appellate court salvaged this
cause of action by referencing the state’s constitu-
tion, which did not allow elimination of established
causes of action for recovery of damages, but the
court could just as easily have accomplished the same
result by dichotomizing claims into statutory and
common law claims, as other courts did. This judicial
attitude is akin to that toward tort reform legislation
in the medical malpractice arena. States have at-
tempted tort reform, and a renewed battle, supported
by the President of the United States himself, is on-
going in this regard. However, courts have repeatedly
viewed this as an impingement on individuals’ rights
to recover damages for legitimate claims. This atti-
tude in protective disclosure claims is evident even in
cases in which the court strictly followed the statu-
tory guidelines, found no liability under the statutory
terms, but expressed clear dissatisfaction with this
statutorily prescribed result.
If courts either disregard or discount Tarasoff stat-
utes, why should policy makers bother? To conclude
that legislative efforts to clarify the confidentiality-
protection dilemma are hopelessly in vain would be a
mistake. Even before the first Tarasoff statute, incon-
sistent and shifting court positions created an amor-
phous, unstable jurisprudence on the issue.7,34 Still
unmeasured is the extent to which Tarasoff statutes
serve to standardize practice and to provide guidance
at the level of trial courts. This review demonstrates
that some courts respect the legislative standard, al-
though in a minority of cases. Nonetheless, policy
makers would be well advised to examine discrepant
responses of courts to Tarasoff statutes as well as rel-
evant state law already established, including the
state’s constitution when drafting a Tarasoff act.
When drafting a potential protective disclosure
statute, policy makers should recognize that the spec-
ificity of the statute might narrow its application and
recognize courts’ propensities to protect the victims’
access to recompense. A clause defining the scope of
the act might alert lawyers and clinicians to the situ-
ational applicability of the statute. Such a clause
might appear simply as follows: “The following act
shall apply when a person is intentionally injured by
a mental health patient.” In addition, statutes could
not only designate when mental health professionals
are not responsible, but could allow for circum-
stances wherein they are responsible due to substan-
dard clinical practice. For example, rather than re-
stricting the clinician’s responsibility to act only in
situations in which the clinician was aware of a spe-
cific threat to a specific victim, extend the clinician’s
responsibility to include an adequate assessment,
when appropriate, to determine the nature and seri-
ousness of the threat. Some statutes have addressed
this problem by including a phrase such as “when a
psychiatrist knows, or should have known. . . .” This
would encourage clinicians to complete more thor-
ough risk evaluations rather than promote less thor-
ough evaluations for fear of discovering a viable
threat leading to some potential legal liability. The
threat itself should also be qualified to allow for clin-
ical assessment of its authenticity, and if this assess-
ment did not take place, it would be another poten-
tial source of liability. Again, some statutes
accomplish this qualification by requiring the threat
to be likely, based on a reasonable clinical assessment.
This type of statute would better define the scope of
its applicability, possibly broadening its use; encour-
age clinicians to complete appropriate evaluations;
and gain favor from reviewing courts that would re-
gard the statute as a means of providing reasonable
protection to patients, potential victims, and
physicians.
Conclusion
Hoping for well-defined limitations of their pro-
tective duties, mental health professionals looked to
legislatures to provide this structure in statutory
form.9,34 Our review of the case law subsequent to
the enactment of such legislation has shown, as pre-
vious Tarasoff law reviews have suggested,35 courts
have taken diverse approaches in interpreting their
state’s respective protective disclosure statutes. Only
in a small number of cases did courts interpret the
statutes to circumscribe the duties owed to third par-
ties. Most, either by ignoring the statute in what
seem to be applicable cases or by finding that a com-
mon law duty remains independent of it, left the
duty to protect ill defined. Because of these ap-
proaches, even decisions that suggest the statute does
clearly define the duty are dubious precedents when
the court does not specifically indicate that the stat-
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ute precludes any other claims. There are even cases
that seemingly expand the protective duty to non-
mental health professional physicians. Although
these physicians traditionally have duties to warn
others of potentially contagious diseases or disorders
that may affect their ability to drive, they have not
had a duty to protect others from the intentional
violent acts of their patients or their patients’
relatives.
Despite the lack of a well-defined duty resulting
from Tarasoff statutes, clinicians are well advised to
be familiar with the statute(s) in their states, and any
case law preceding or following enactment(s). To
help clinicians identify any trends in a certain state, a
table that lists cases, the deciding courts, and the
approaches taken by them in each state has been
included (Table 1). Adding further to the lack of
clarity, other cases, not pertaining to mental health
but to liability to third parties in a different context,
may also be predictive of a higher court’s interpreta-
tion of a statute. For example, in Florida, at least two
appellate courts have been reluctant to find a protec-
tive duty for mental health professionals, given the
permissive statute (see Table 1). However, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in Pate v. Threlkel 36 imposed a
duty to warn of the genetic transferability of a disease
and extended the liability for breach of that duty to a
patient’s children, indicating that the highest state
court might be more inclined to find a duty to third
parties in a mental health context as well.
In a given situation, a court may take any of several
approaches toward the state’s protective disclosure
statute, including ignoring it, strictly following its
terms, or following previous decisions. A psychiatrist
may practice in a jurisdiction where courts consis-
tently apply the statute, or where the supreme court
of the state has rendered an opinion that cannot be
contradicted by lower courts. In these circumstances,
a protective duty may be more reliably defined. For
most, however, the best course of action is to practice
within the proper standard of care and be guided by
professional ethics, while maintaining an updated
knowledge of the relevant statutory and case law.
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